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4ABSTRACT
The paper attempts to analyse the impact of devolution of taxes
and distribution grants by the Centre to the States in India by taking
fourteen major States for the time period 1980-81 to 2006-07. The study
focuses on the impact of inter- State distribution of Central grants and
taxes. Analysis reveals that formula based tax devolution has been more
equalising than grants. Study finds that there is need to explore
alternative mechanisms.
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51. General Backdrop
Centre State relations are being widely discussed in the context
of the Justice Punchi Commission on Centre-State relations and the
Thirteenth Finance Commission. They are presently in their final phase
of work. During 1980-81 to 2006-07, the time period selected for our
analysis, a few perceptible changes took place in the mechanism
devolution of taxes and distribution of grants from the Centre to the
States. During this period, substantial measure of tax reform at the Central
and State levels took place.
Regarding tax devolution, the Tenth Finance Commission
(1995-2000) recommended that all taxes (except surcharge and cess) be
made part of the divisible pool instead of only Personal Income Tax and
Central Excise Duty which were the taxes that were devolved till then.
During this period, the Centre began taxing the Services (since 1994),
from which a major portion of Gross Domestic Product at the national
level as well as the Gross State Domestic Product of the States was
generated from. This became shareable through the awards of the Finance
Commissions till the Twelfth. The Eighty Eighth Constitutional
amendment, took the Services tax outside the divisible pool of taxes
and the Thirteenth Finance Commission will not be able to award shares
of service tax to the States.
During the 1980s and 1990s major reforms were undertaken by
the Union Government in both indirect taxes and direct taxes. The
6reforms were initiated with the introduction of Modified Value Added
Tax (MODVAT) in Central Excise during the mid-1980s and later in the
direct taxes front by slashing the rates. The latter began during the
1980s and gathered momentum during the 1990s. Indirect taxes which
comprised more than 80 percent of Centre’s tax revenue during the
1980s came down to around 50 percent by 2006-07. During the period,
the Centre’s tax-GDP ratio fell (during the 1990s), before rising again
(in the latter half of the 2000s).
During the first half of the 2000s, sales tax was replaced with
Value Added Tax (VAT) for intra-State sales (except for commodities
like liquor and petroleum products). Presently, Goods and Services Tax
(GST) is being scheduled to be introduced from 01.04.2010. All these
have considerable implications for tax revenue of Centre and States as
well as devolution.
In the General Purpose grants distributed by the Finance
Commission, under Article 275 of the Constitution, a major change
took place. The Ninth Finance Commission (1990-95) adopted
Normative criteria to distribute General Purpose grants. Till then, they
were granted as gap fillers in the Non-Plan Revenue account of the
States1.  Despite the evolution of Normative criteria, General Purpose
grants, in effect, continue to be gap fillers based on estimates of future
revenue and expenditure of States. Besides this, the Centre also
distributes non-formula based discretionary grants to the States. (one
major component of the discretionary grants is the increasing number of
Centrally Sponsored Schemes)
The period 1980-81 to 2006-072 includes two sub-periods, that
is, the decade of 1980s which is prior to the changes in tax devolution
and grant distribution and the decade and a half after the change. But
our discussions rely largely on Eleventh and Twelfth Finance
Commission for suggesting changes.
7The Constitutional provisions for devolution of resources is
intended for addressing,
a)  Vertical imbalances and
b)   Horizontal imbalances.
The first one is to take care of the imbalances between the Union and
the States due to limited revenue powers and vast expenditure obligations
of the latter. All elastic and buoyant tax bases like Personal Income Tax,
Corporation Tax, Excise duty on manufacture (other than alcoholic
beverages) and Customs Duty are with the Centre. The States mainly tax
purchase and sale of commodities. This is a comparatively inelastic tax
compared to the former. The alternative to devolution is transferring powers
to tax to the States, which is not generally considered on efficiency and
uniformity grounds3 (See Ter Minassian, 1997 for a discussion).
Horizontal imbalances exist due to differing levels of capacity for
resource mobilisation by different States as their per capita income levels
vary widely. Addressing Horizontal imbalances is to enable States with
poorer per capita income (per capita GSDP) to provide a basic minimum
level of services as the richer States do. This will have to be taken into
consideration while deciding formula for inter-se distribution of
devolved taxes.
Our study attempts to look into the problem of  inter se distribution
of taxes and grants among the States which have differing fiscal capacities
and are at different levels of development. For  analysis, we are taking
fourteen major States in India. The selected States are from all geographic
regions and at different levels of per capita Gross State Domestic Product
(GSDP). Special Category States including the North Eastern States are
not included as the criteria for distribution of grants to them and the
problems they face are totally different and not directly comparable
with that of other States4. The study analyses devolution of taxes and
8distribution of grants, which impact the revenue side of the budgets.
Central loans for Plans and loans out of Small Savings Schemes, are not
made part of this study.
The discussion on the differential impact of devolution of taxes
and distribution of grants, assumes importance in view of the persisting
Horizontal imbalances among the States. The political scenario during
the period of study is also briefly outlined in this paper.
2. Objective of the Study
The paper examines the impact of Central devolution of taxes
and distribution of grants to various States and groups of States namely,
High income, Middle income and Low income. The grouping is made
by arranging them in descending order of per capita GSDP, with the top
four States classified as High income,  the subsequent five categorised
as Middle income and the last  five as Low income States. The focus is on
the impact of devolution of taxes and distribution of grants  in the context
of persisting horizontal imbalances. Suggestions for change in the criteria
for devolution of taxes and distribution of grants are also discussed.
3. Distribution of Fiscal Powers and Mechanism of Devolution- A
Summary
During the British rule, there was strong political and fiscal
centralisation. A series of piecemeal exercises in transfer of power to the
provinces, culminated in the Government of India Act of 1935.5  This
later became the bedrock of the Centre-State relations in the Constitution
in which the position of the Centre vis-à-vis the States is very powerful.
Indian Constitution is described as a federal one with very strong unitary
features.
Though the powers of the States including that of revenue
mobilisation and expenditure obligations are laid down in the
Constitution, the Centre has several overriding powers The most
9important Unitary feature in fiscal distribution is that Parliament without
the consent of more than half the legislatures can alter the size of the
divisible pool of taxes from which Finance Commission can recommend
States’ and each State’s shares6.
The Constitution of India has provided mechanisms to devolve
taxes and distribute grants to the States. The Finance Commission
recommends the percentage of the Central Taxes to be shared with the
States and the distribution among the States is determined on the basis
of criteria formulated by each Commission.
The  General Purpose grants are distributed as mandated under
Article 275 of the Constitution by the Finance Commissions, after
determining the tax devolution shares by making normative
projections of revenue and expenditure of the States (the practice of
normative estimation started with the Ninth Finance Commission).
There are also specific grants distributed by the Finance
Commissions. The Plan grants and those for Centrally Sponsored
Schemes are disbursed by the Planning Commission and Central
Ministries respectively.7  The Plan grants are distributed on the basis
of modified Gadgil formula8.
4.  Per capita GSDP Rankings of States: A Brief Overview
Before proceeding to examine the main issues of the study, let us look
at the per capita income rankings of fourteen States during the period 1980-
81 to 2006-07. We consider per capita Gross Domestic Product of a State as
the measure of comparable fiscal capacity across the States9.
Though there is no movement between the groups, namely, High,
Middle and Low income States, there have been some movements within
the groups as can be seen from the change in ranks in consecutive time
periods (Table 1).
It can be seen that the Range, which is the simple measure of the
difference between the average per capita income of the Highest income
10
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State and that of the Lowest income State, has increased during each
sub-period of the period between 1980-85 to 2000-06 (See Table 2).
When States are grouped into High, Middle and Low income
groups10, the disparities between High and Low income States have
increased throughout the period. The ratio of the average per capita
incomes of four High Income States and the five Low Income States has
increased from 1.86 during 1980-85 to 2.40 in 2000-06 (See Table 3).
Likewise, the disparities between the Middle and Low Income States
have also increased. But there is a slight decline in the gap between the
High and Middle Income States.
It is clear that not only fiscal capacities of the States differ but the
gap is widening. It is in this background of Horizontal Imbalances, that
we are proceeding to analyse the Central transfer of taxes and grants to
the States. As regards, the reasons for the differing per capita income
Table 3: Per Capita Income Levels of State Groups and their Ratios
Group 1980-85 1985-90 1990-95 1995-00 2000-06
Average
High 3134 5262 10675 20046 28948
Middle 2096 3586 7171 14446 22592
Low 1682 2774 5178 9176 12077
Ratios
H:L 1.86 1.90 2.06 2.18 2.40
H:M 1.50 1.47 1.49 1.39 1.28
M:L 1.25 1.29 1.38 1.57 1.87
Source: Computed from Central Statistical Organisation Data
Note: H –High M- Middle L- Low. The States included are the ones
classified as such as per Table1 based on discussion in Section 2
14
levels and also growth rates, their analysis is beyond the scope of this
study.
5.  Central Tax Devolution to States- State-Wise Impact
Though there is consensus among the States that a higher share of
Central taxes should be devolved to them11, there is difference in
approach on what basis the taxes devolved is to be shared. It will be
clear if the memoranda of different States to the Finance Commissions
are perused.
Prior to the Eleventh Finance Commission, multiple criteria
like collection12, backwardness, poverty ratio etc.13 were used for
devolving a percentage of Personal Income Tax and Excise duties.
The criteria used by the Eleventh Finance Commission for devolving
a fixed share of all taxes were Population, Distance, Area, Index of
Infrastructure, Tax Effort and Fiscal Discipline. The Twelfth Finance
Commission has dropped the Index of Infrastructure from the criteria.
The two major criteria are Population and Distance. The latter is the
gap between the per capita GSDP of a State from the average of the
highest three per capita GSDP States. The respective weights were 10
and 62.5 in the Eleventh Finance Commission and 25 and 50 percent
in the Twelfth Finance Commission.14 Let us see how the tax
devolution has impacted on different States during the time period
1980-81 to 2006-07.
While Uttar Pradesh and Bihar have ranked high in tax
devolution, other Low income States like Orissa and Rajasthan have
not ranked high. Middle income States such as West Bengal and Andhra
Pradesh have ranked high in tax devolution. But certain other Middle
income States with better tax effort have ranked low in tax devolution
[For example, Kerala, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu (except during
1980-85)] 15.
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Table 5: Period Wise Share of Low Middle and High Income States
in Central Tax Devolution
Period Middle High Low
1980-85 33.23 17.59 49.18
1985-90 33.38 14.18 52.44
1990-95 33.12 14.60 52.28
1995-2000 33.79 14.12 52.09
2000-06 32.92 11.50 55.57
Source:  Computed from data available in RBI  State finances A Study
of Budgets, various issues
When States are grouped on the basis of per capita Gross State
Domestic Product (Table 5), it is seen that during the period 1980-81 to
2006-07, the devolution of taxes have had an equalising impact.  The
share of Lower Income States has gone up and that of High Income
States has fallen. This could be due to the change in criteria of devolution
adopted by the Finance Commissions. At present, there is no weightage
for the collection of Central Taxes from the State, which was previously
there. Another feature to be noted is the stagnant share of the Middle
income States and a minor fall in their share during 2000-06, the period
of the Eleventh Finance Commission.16
6.  Grant Distribution by the Centre to the States
Grants are another important component of Central revenue
transfers and they are both formula based and discretionary.  Grants to
the States are disbursed by the Finance Commission, Planning
Commission and the Central Ministries.
6.1  Grants by the Finance Commission
(i)   Statutory Grants under Article 275
Based on formula, taxes are devolved amongst the States and the
post devolution revenue and expenditure positions estimated on a
17
normative basis (since the Ninth Finance Commission), for the next
quiquennial period,. This is considered for grant distribution. Since
Planning Commission also disburses grants, the Finance Commissions
(except the Ninth) have been distributing only non-plan grants by filling
the normatively estimated gap in non-plan revenue account.17 The
purpose of filling the gap in the non-Plan revenue account is to make
available funds for Plan implementation, so that borrowed money is not
spent for non-Plan recurring expenditure.18
After the 1960s, when the periods of the Finance Commissions
and that of the Plans were not coinciding, these estimates and actuals
were vastly different because the amount of plan expenditure getting
transferred to the non-plan account was not known to the Finance
Commissions. The difficulties in this regard have been discussed by in
the report of the Eleventh Finance Commission.
(ii)  In addition to Article 275 grants, Finance Commissions also
grant specific grants for upgradation of standards in various spheres of
administration and also grants for augmenting Consolidated Funds of
the States for devolution of financial resources to the Panchayats and
Municipalities.
6.2   Other Grants
Besides, Finance Commissions, the Planning Commission and
the Central Ministries also distribute grants. This is done under Article
282 of the Constitution which provides for Miscellaneous Financial
Provisions.19  The latter grants are distributed for State Plans, Central
Plans and Centrally Sponsored Schemes.  While the grants for State
Plans are distributed under the Gadgil formula based on criteria like
Population, special problems of the States, tax effort, fiscal discipline
etc, there are ad hoc discretionary grants and grants like Centrally
Sponsored Schemes based on scheme specific criteria. We will look at
the aggregate and disaggregate picture of grants to the States for the
recent period from 1990-91 to 2006-07, later.
18
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There is a perceptible fall in the share of the Low Income states in
total grants, whereas that of the Middle Income States has considerably
risen. There is a minor increase in the case of High Income States. The
fall in share of Low income States is to the extent of 11.92 per cent, with
that of Middle Income States going up by 9.56 percent (Table 7). In
State-wise rankings Orissa, a Low income State is low in ranking of
grant receipts. Middle Income States like Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil
Nadu have also ranked low. A High Income State like Maharashtra has
ranked high in grant receipts. Bihar has got lower ranking in grant
receipts.
The above discussion indicates that the impact of distribution of
grants has been less progressive than that of devolution of taxes.
Table 7:  Period Wise Share in Central Grants of Low, Middle and
High Income States
Period Middle High Low
1980-85 29.48 17.44 53.07
1985-90 31.64 19.43 46.73
1990-95 30.44 15.46 54.11
1995-2000 34.43 17.88 47.68
2000-06 39.04 19.82 41.15
Source: Computed from RBI State Finances: A Study of Budgets, various
issues
6.3 Grants - Disaggregate Picture
(i) Centrally Sponsored Schemes
The share of Centrally Sponsored Schemes is on an average 32
percent of total grants during the period 1990-91 to 2006-07.20  It is a
very important discretionary grant by the Centre to the States. Let us
now proceed to see the share of resources which different States get from
the total grants under Centrally Sponsored schemes.
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Table  8:  Share of States in Centrally Sponsored Schemes
States 1990-95 1995-2000 2000-2006
Andhra 8.90 10.84 11.16
Bihar 10.87 7.10 6.39
Gujarat 5.27 3.38 4.99
Haryana 2.59 3.26 2.97
Karnataka 6.30 6.69 9.46
Kerala 3.82 3.90 3.83
Maharashtra 9.76 11.29 9.21
Madhya Pradesh 9.77 9.29 8.95
Orissa 5.56 4.95 5.27
Punjab 2.12 2.75 2.07
Rajasthan 7.90 9.47 11.23
Tamil Nadu 7.02 7.09 7.11
Uttar Pradesh 16.03 13.69 12.02
West Bengal 3.87 6.31 8.18
Year High Middle Low
1990-95 19.75 29.91 50.12
1995-2000 18.68 34.83 46.49
2000-06 18.97 39.73 44.13
The share of the Low income States has come down, while that of
Middle income States has gone up.  Among the latter, the share of Andhra
Pradesh, Karnataka and West Bengal has gone up while that of Kerala
and Tamil Nadu has stagnated. The shares of States having low per
capita GSDP like Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh has come
down while that of Rajasthan has gone up. The share of Orissa has
stagnated. States with high per capita GSDP like Maharashtra have got
a higher share than the Low income States. The picture does not indicate
an equalising effect21. There is a prevalent view that Centrally Sponsored
Schemes need to be reconsidered by transfer of the Schemes with the
funds to the States22. As the States are at differing levels of development,
uniform criteria may not be suitable.
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One argument in favour of Centrally Sponsored Schemes is that
they address national priorities. In public finance literature, out of the
three main functions of stabilisation, distribution and allocation, the
first two are to be with the Federation and the last one with the
provinces23.  Most of the Centrally Sponsored Schemes fall in the area
of distribution. Oates (1999) has opined that in a Federation, the States
have acted as fiscal laboratories for successful national level
implementation of the schemes. This view seems appropriate in the
Indian context.
It is to be noted that many of the Centrally Sponsored Schemes
like Noon Meal Scheme and National Rural Employment Guarantee
Act (NREGA) have State-level predecessors. Tamil Nadu and Kerala
had implemented Noon Meal schemes successfully since the 1960s and
Maharashtra had implemented Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS)
since the 1970s. States may be encouraged to formulate schemes with
location specific criteria as part of the State plans and funds may be
provided on a monitorable basis.
(ii)  Statutory Grants
Statutory grants to the States are distributed by the Finance
Commissions based on criteria fixed by them.
 The substantial fall in the share of Low income States is due to
the decline in the share of Bihar. The rise in share of Middle income
States is due to the increase in share of West Bengal. The share of some
individual States shows wide fluctuation.
(iii)   Grants  for State Plans
Plan grants to States are distributed on the basis modified Gadgil
formula. The share of the Low income States is declining and that of the
Middle income States increasing. The increase in the share of Middle
income States has come due to the rise in the share of Andhra Pradesh
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Table 9: Shares of States in Statutory Grants
States 1990-95 1995-2000 2000-06
Andhra Pradesh 14.72 19.54 6.16
Bihar 31.99 4.44 1.83
Gujarat 1.23 4.96 2.82
Haryana 0.34 0.75 1.11
Karnataka 0.63 1.43 2.84
Kerala 1.74 1.41 4.29
Maharashtra 1.46 2.46 3.00
Madhya Pradesh 4.70 5.37 4.77
Orissa 9.08 5.50 5.39
Punjab 6.70 7.17 1.93
Rajasthan 11.21 10.57 16.59
Tamil Nadu 1.34 2.56 2.21
Uttar Pradesh 9.76 19.37 12.08
West Bengal 6.62 14.49 33.64
High Middle Low
12.97 25.06 63.50
18.24 39.43 42.33
10.63 49.14 38.89
and Karnataka. Share of Kerala has been almost stagnant and that of
Tamil Nadu and West Bengal has come down. Among the Low income
States, the share of Bihar has increased while that of Uttar Pradesh and
Rajasthan has come down. The movement over the period is not
equalising.
The disaggregate picture of grants reveal that the share of the Low
income States has been coming down and there is wide fluctuation in
share of Statutory Grants. The share of grants among States has not been
23
Table 10: Shares of States in State Plan Grants
Year 1990-95 1995-2000 2000-06
Andhra Pradesh 6.61 9.12 11.58
Bihar 6.71 7.69 9.18
Gujarat 3.81 5.06 6.79
Haryana 1.10 2.28 2.32
Karnataka 3.15 5.20 6.30
Kerala 3.93 3.01 3.25
Maharashtra 9.34 6.13 7.49
Madhya Pradesh 5.65 9.01 8.09
Orissa 5.33 6.50 7.46
Punjab 1.57 2.15 1.90
Rajasthan 7.98 6.27 5.38
Tamil Nadu 5.86 7.52 6.84
Uttar Pradesh 28.51 19.78 15.48
West Bengal 10.44 10.26 7.95
Year High Middle Low
1990-95 12.01 29.99 54.19
1995-2000 10.57 35.13 49.25
2000-06 11.71 35.92 45.58
an equalising one when their per capita GSDP ranking is considered.
Comparing the State-wise movements in the share of discretionary and
formula based grants and enquiring into its reasons is an area which can
be identified for further study.
(iv)  Grants as tool for fiscal correction
The Eleventh and Twelfth Finance Commissions attempted to
use grant distribution as a negative incentive for ensuring achievements
in deficit targets. While the Eleventh Finance Commission recommended
24
withholding of a portion of grants to be released to States on achieving
targets, the Twelfth Finance Commission made debt relief conditional
on achieving the targets. It is suggested that incentive grants may be
devolved for fiscal performance, Instead of a deficit based indicator,
revenue effort can be made the criterion as the former can be achieved by
an indiscriminate expenditure cut. Suggested measures are:
a) Improvement in tax buoyancy24 , of base period and a reference period
b) Improvement in proportion of own revenue to revenue expenditure
from base period to reference period.
7. Central Tax Devolution and Grant Distribution - Salient Features
and  Suggestions
7.1 Tax Devolution
Tax devolution constitutes the major part of Central devolution,
(almost 60 percent) and the grants constitute the balance. As already
stated, there are multiple criteria for tax devolution, though the
complexity has come down since the Eleventh Finance Commission.
The criteria used are:
1. Population
2. Distance
3. Area
4. Index of Infrastructure (dropped by the Twelfth Finance
Commission)
5. Tax Effort
6. Fiscal Discipline
The first two have substantial weights (up to 75 percent). It is
suggested that tax devolution being general purpose one, it should
have the broad objective of attempting to tackle horizontal imbalances,
If specific grants are distributed taking into consideration the level of
education and other social services, the need for multiple criteria in tax
devolution will be avoidable.
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Tax devolution should not be the tool to consider emerging and
specific needs of States which actually should be taken care of through
grants. Grants can be made purpose based and need not act as gap fillers
in post tax devolution situation as it is at present. Incentive criteria like
better tax effort and fiscal discipline can be used for granting additional
incentive grants.
Criteria of Population and Distance
As already seen, population and distance are the two criteria with
75 percent weightage in inter se distribution of taxes.  There are other
criteria like Area, Index of Infrastructure, Tax Effort and Fiscal Discipline.
The criteria like Area and Index of Infrastructure have been included
taking into consideration the fact that more the area and poorer the
infrastructure, the cost of providing the services will be greater. Specific
problems due to these can be left to be tackled through grants. Tax
devolution should aim at equalising fiscal capacities.
For tax devolution, Distance weighted by Population seems to be
an appropriate criterion as it provides more to States with lesser fiscal
capacity. When various weights have been given to Distance and
Population and alternative shares for various States computed, we find
that Horizontal imbalances  by way of differing fiscal capacities are
better addressed by giving Distance a substantial share weighted by
Population25 (See Appendix  for a Discussion).
7.2   Distribution of Grants- Suggestions
Though our discussion is focused on the Statutory Grants under
Article 275 distributed by the Finance Commissions, other grants are
also looked at briefly.
A)    Statutory Grants by the Finance Commission
The Statutory grants are distributed on the basis of normative
criteria and the estimates of gap in non-Plan revenue account and the
26
actuals have vastly differed. Moreover, the impact of statutory grants
has not been equalising as seen earlier and there is wide fluctuation in
the shares of different States.
Disbursing grants for filling gaps needs to be reconsidered. Any
gap filling (for differing fiscal capacities) needs to be done through tax
devolution and grants should be specific purpose based on criteria26.
The changes, to be brought about, will need discussion with the States
and should take into consideration Constitutional implications.
The gap in State level indicators in education, health,
infrastructure etc. needs to be measured using transparent criteria and
grants for achieving a specified level distributed. The filling of post tax
devolution deficits in non-Plan revenue account using estimates of future
expenditure and revenue estimates amounts to doing again through
grants  by not so transparent methodology, what the tax devolution
does on the basis of transparent criteria. It is felt that this can be changed
and the corresponding share of the States in tax devolution can be
increased from the 30.5 percent recommended by the Twelfth Finance
Commission so that there is no loss to the States.
There can be a criticism that States will lose an important source
of untied transfer of resources from the Centre. But it is to be taken note
of that the General Purpose grants under Article 275, which are essentially
gap fillers of non-Plan Revenue account, have not served the purpose
they are meant for. They are actually an attempt to augment the fiscal
capacity of a State to undertake activities in social, economic and
infrastructural activities by taking care of the recurring current
expenditure obligations. It would be better, if this is done through
increased tax devolution based on simple criteria.27
B)   Other Grants
As regards other grants, it is suggested that the transfer of existing
Centrally Sponsored Schemes with funds needs to be considered. In
27
future, instead of formulating schemes with straitjacket national criteria,
State specific plans should be formulated and Plan grants distributed.
Broad issues only need to be identified at the Central level.
8.  Political Background- A Brief Overview
When there is substantial discretion in inter-se distribution of
resources, the political situation in the federal set up becomes a crucial
factor which needs discussion. A detailed analysis has not been attempted
in this paper. However, we feel that it is necessary to outline the
background, which could provide leads for formulation of hypothesis
for a further study in this area.
The period under  analysis witnessed considerable changes in the
political scenario. The long period of single party rule at the Centre was
replaced initially by minority governments depending on outside support
and later by coalition governments with parties having predominant
regional base.  Some of them which had been protagonists of States’ rights
in the earlier decades are sharing power at the Centre28.
In the initial three decades (till 1977), there was uninterrupted
rule by the Congress Party. During that thirty year period, the character
of the party itself underwent changes.  In the initial two decades after
independence, the Congress party had a Central leadership with a
national appeal with States headed by powerful provincial leaders.
Later, the powerful provincial leadership faded away and a single
leader at the national level became the plenipotentiary29. The low
point of political centralisation  was during 1967-69, when ruling
parties in nine States were different from that in the Centre and the
high point was 1975-77, the period of the internal emergency. The
dissipating tendencies in political centralism gathered momentum
in the latter half of the 1980s with many States coming under the rule
of different parties other than the single party which was ruling at the
Centre.
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But the 1990s heralded a markedly different period with further
setbacks for political centralisation. Coalition and Minority governments,
in which State based political parties had a pivotal role, came to power at
the Centre. The Supreme Court judgement in the case of S.R. Bommai
signaled the stymieing of rather unbridled power to displace State
Governments under Article 356 of the Constitution30. This period can be
termed as one during which centrifugal tendencies in centralised political
system gathered momentum.31
Paradoxically, this period and the first half of the decade 2000-
2010 witnessed centralisation of fiscal powers. The tax on Services
(except a few such as Electricity duty and Entertainment tax) was made
the exclusive domain of the Centre; first under Residuary power and
later under the Union List. Fiscal targets were made mandatory initially
through Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) and later through Fiscal
Responsibility Legislations. The transfer of grants and debt relief by the
Finance Commissions were made conditional on these. Studies (Isaac
and Ramakumar 2006) indicate that the Central devolution to the States
fell during this period. The imposition of VAT based on rate harmonisation
instead of one based on  floor rates to reduce tax competition and attempts
to introduce Goods and Services Tax (GST) .32 which will involve the
restructuring of the taxing powers of the Centre and the States   also took
place during this period. Broadly, this can be called a period during
which centripetal tendencies in fiscal policy gathered strength33.
While the demand for a higher share in devolution will have
considerable force in a scenario in which parties with State specific
political base share power at the Centre, the problem of inter se
distribution of taxes and grants will evade consensus. It is felt that in the
interests of equity as well as for a healthy existence of a federal polity,
ad hoc discretions need to be eliminated and devolution be based on
objective and transparent criteria. Devolving a higher share will not in
itself take care of this. Waxing influence of State based parties at the
national level may also not result in this because, greater influence can
29
be used for getting State specific packages, which are ad hoc and
discretionary34. Though in the recent Lok Sabha elections, there appears
to be a reverse trend, it is too early to assume that the centrifugal
tendencies have ebbed leading to another era of political centralism.
This paper only intends to bring forth a few main aspects in this
regard as Centre-State fiscal relations, with discretionary devolution of
resources, is substantially determined by the political background. The
province of this paper does not extend to an in-depth analysis of this.
But there is enough scope for further study on political aspects of
resource distribution, especially, discretionary ones.
9. Highlights in lieu of Conclusion
The study analyses  and finds that the impact of tax devolution to
the States had a more equalising impact than that of distribution of
grants35 . There is considerable discretionary element in the latter while
the former is criteria based.
The paper suggests avoiding multiple criteria for tax devolution
and change in a criteria for  disbursal of General Purpose grants from the
present gap filling  to ones taking into consideration emergent and
specific needs of the States. Differing fiscal capacities can be taken care
of through tax devolution. The share of States in tax devolution needs
to be higher for ensuring that the States are not at a disadvantage due to
restructuring of the grants.
The negative use of grants for achieving a target of deficit indicators
have been questioned on the basis of Constitutional validity (See Bagchi
2008, Isaac and Chakraborthy, 2008) as well as on its impact on the
means to achieve these indicators. Instead, incentive grants in a positive
manner for achieving better own revenue effort can be considered. They
need not emphasise on deficits which can be achieved by cutting
expenditure without augmenting revenue. These incentive grants will be
for revenue led fiscal consolidation instead of a mere deficit reduction36.
30
The present design of Centrally Sponsored Schemes needs to be
restructured by transferring existing schemes with the funds to the States.
In future, instead of having schemes with uniform criteria throughout,
specific schemes with criteria suiting the local needs can be made part
of State plans and funds provided by the Centre on monitorable basis.
 To attempt restructuring of tax devolution and grant distribution
among States in a country like India in the present circumstances is an
arduous and a politically tantalising task. Nevertheless, it needs to be
discussed and attempted.
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APPENDIX
Criteria for Tax Devolution
We examine various combinations of Population and Distance as
criteria for devolution aimed at tackling Horizontal imbalances. Distance
is the gap of the per capita income of a State from the average of the
highest three States. (We have considered the figures of per capita income
of States given ian the report of the Twelfth Finance Commission, which
is the average as on 2001-02).
Either Distance or Population alone is not sufficient and
devolution aimed at augmenting fiscal capacity for providing minimum
services to the citizens should include Distance and Population and the
computations show that Distance should have more weightage in the
interest of equity. The shares of the group of High, Middle, Low income
States do not differ much when 1971 and 2001 population are used but
the shares of States like Kerala and Tamil Nadu go down when 2001
population is used.
The shares of the High, Middle and Low income States based on
alternative combinations are shown below. Though Population used a
sole criteria offers a higher share to the groups, States with lesser fiscal
capacity get a lesser rank in devolution than the States with higher
fiscal capacity.  To balance, a criterion with both Population and Distance
seems to be a better one.
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A)  100 percent Distance
Bihar 5.83
Uttar Pradesh 5.02
Orissa 4.94
Madhya Pradesh 4.54
Rajasthan 4.21
West Bengal 3.77
Andhra Pradesh 3.49
Karnataka 3.14
Tamil Nadu 2.78
Kerala 2.74
Haryana 2.08
Punjab 2.08
Maharashtra 2.08
Gujarat 2.76
B)  100 Percent Population
State Share State Share
1971 Population 2001 Population
Uttar Pradesh 15.68 Uttar Pradesh 16.34
Maharashtra 9.43 Maharashtra 9.53
West Bengal 8.29 West Bengal 8.47
Andhra Pradesh 8.14 Bihar 8.16
Bihar 7.88 Andhra Pradesh 7.49
Tamil Nadu 7.78 Tamil Nadu 6.14
Madhya Pradesh 5.61 Madhya Pradesh 5.93
Gujarat 5 Rajasthan 5.55
Rajasthan 4.83 Karnataka 5.11
Orissa 4.1 Gujarat 4.98
Kerala 3.99 Orissa 3.62
Karnataka 3.8 Kerala 3.13
Punjab 2.54 Punjab 2.4
Haryana 1.87 Haryana 2.07
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 When Population is used as a single criterion, we find States with
higher per capita incomes like Maharashtra, West Bengal and Andhra
Pradesh getting more share than Bihar, the lowest Per capita income
State. Southern States of Kerala and Tamil Nadu which have done better
in Population control and health indicators get a better share when
1971 population is used.
C)   50 Percent Distance and 50 Percent Population
State Based on 1971 State Based on 2001
Population  Population
Uttar Pradesh 10.35 Uttar Pradesh 10.68
Bihar 6.86 Bihar 7
West Bengal 6.03 West Bengal 6.12
Andhra Pradesh 5.81 Maharashtra 5.8
Maharashtra 5.76 Andhra Pradesh 5.49
Tamil Nadu 5.28 Madhya Pradesh 5.23
Madhya Pradesh 5.08 Rajasthan 4.88
Orissa 4.52 Tamil Nadu 4.46
Rajasthan 4.52 Orissa 4.28
Gujarat 3.88 Karnataka 4.13
Karnataka 3.47 Gujarat 3.87
Kerala 3.36 Kerala 2.93
Punjab 2.31 Punjab 2.24
Haryana 1.98 Haryana 2.08
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D)   75 percent Distance 25 percent Population
State Based on State Based on
1971Population 2001 Population
Uttar Pradesh 7.69 Uttar Pradesh 7.85
Bihar 6.35 Bihar 6.42
West Bengal 4.9 West Bengal 4.95
Madhya Pradesh 4.81 Madhya Pradesh 4.89
Orissa 4.73 Orissa 4.61
Andhra Pradesh 4.65 Rajasthan 4.55
Rajasthan 4.37 Andhra Pradesh 4.49
Tamil Nadu 4.03 Maharashtra 3.94
Maharashtra 3.92 Karnataka 3.63
Gujarat 3.32 Tamil Nadu 3.62
Karnataka 3.3 Gujarat 3.31
Kerala 3.05 Kerala 2.83
Punjab 2.2 Punjab 2.16
Haryana 2.03 Haryana 2.08
Distance is the gap between the per capita income of the State
from the average of the three highest per capita income States. The share
Di of a State is its Distance divided by the sum of the Distances. The
share of highest three States is the notional Distance between their per
capita income and that of the fourth State. The computation is based on
the methodology adopted by the Twelfth Finance Commission. Share
based on Population is the share of the Population of the respective
State in total Population.
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Notes
1 Though the report of the Ninth Finance Commission discussed the
methodology for making normative estimates, subsequent Commissions
have not disclosed how they arrived at normative estimates. This has been
criticised by States like Kerala.
2 The latest year for which comparable accounts figure of receipts and
expenditure is available is 2006-07. For the later years, only budget estimates
and revised estimates are available which are not directly comparable with
accounts.
3 Corporation  tax and Personal income tax are elastic taxes and they are
levied by the Centre rather than the States as the bases are mobile and State
level taxes on these can lead to shifting of tax bases and resulting inefficient
impacts. The necessity for Union to levy these rather buoyant taxes results
in Vertical imbalances in fiscal distribution of powers between the Union
and the States.
4 The Plan assistance from the Centre to Special Category States is divided in
the ratio of 90 :10 between grants and loans and 70:30 between loans and
grants for other States. The Twelfth Finance Commission recommended
doing away with Central loans and it has been accepted.
5 See Vithal and Sastry (2001) for a discussion
6 Article 368 deals with amending the provisions of the Constitution. For
some of the amendments to come into effect, it requires ratification of more
than half of the legislatures. For altering the divisible pool of taxes to be
shared between the Centre and the States, this is not required.
7 Finance Commissions till the Fourth did not make the distinction between
plan and non-plan grants. After that, all Finance Commissions, except the
Ninth, were distributing only non-Plan grants. Plan grants and other grants
by various Ministries are granted under Article 282 of the Constitution
which is a provision for Miscellaneous Financial Powers.
8 For a discussion, see Vittal and Sastry (2002).
9 Many other indices like inequality, poverty ratio, human development indices
etc. can be factored in for considering which States are similarly placed. But
as per traditional principles of devolution States with higher per capita
incomes can mobilise resources for providing a level of services which will
in turn address the above mentioned issues. For want of another comparable
measure, Gross Domestic Product (GSDP) is used. See the Report of the
Twelfth Finance Commission for a discussion. For suggestions of an
alternative base, see Kannan and Hari (2002).
10 The States in the High, Middle and Low Income Group as per the
categorisation in the text have not changed during the entire time
period.
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11 The Finance Ministers of all the States have jointly represented to the Centre
that 50 percent of the tax revenue of the Centre be devolved to the States.
12 There is a view that if collection is not used as a criterion, there will be
discontent among States from whose territory more Central taxes are
collected. Kurian (2008). But the aim of devolution is not rewarding
collection. It is meant for attempting to equalise fiscal capacities so that all
States are able to provide a minimum level of services.
13 For details of criteria for devolution from First Finance Commission onwards,
see www.fincomindia.com
14 The Terms of Reference of the Twelfth and Thirteenth Finance Commission
suggest that where ever Population is used as a criterion, it will be 1971
population. The Report of the Twelfth Finance Commission has not made
any mention whether it has used 1971 population or not.
15 This aspect, that is, of perverse incentives, in which States with relatively
poorer bases exploiting the same better to achieve a higher tax effort getting
a lesser share than richer States with a poorer tax effort, is a separate area
requiring detailed analysis, into which we are not venturing into.
16 It is to be taken note of that the recommendations of the Eleventh Finance
Commission drew protests from the Middle income States like Andhra
Pradesh.
17 The gap in the non- Plan Revenue account is also called Balance from
Current Revenues (BCR). This is the gap between Revenue receipts net of
plan grants and non plan revenue expenditure.
18 The gap filling role has been criticised as fiscal dentistry by some
commentators. Resources for Plans comprise Additional Resource
Mobilisation (ARM), loans and grants. If there is a deficit in non-Plan
revenue account,  most of the resources will go to meeting this. This will
adversely affect Plan spending and future outlay.
19 See the report of the Ninth Finance Commission for a discussion on the
Constitutional issues in making grants under Article 282 in a substantial
manner.
20 The disaggregate picture is analysed from 1999-91 to 2006-07. The time
period is long enough to get an idea of the impact  of Centrally Sponsored
Schemes and State Plan grants as there has been no substantial change in
their distribution criteria.
21 There is a view that the richer States have intra State inequality and this
should be taken care of while devolving resources like taxes and distributing
grants for Centrally Sponsored Schemes. The example of Maharashtra with
inequality between Mumbai and other districts is cited as an example. While
this reason can be to an extent acceptable for grants, which use backwardness
criteria of districts, it is not acceptable for tax devolution as the overall fiscal
capacity has to be seen. A State with more overall fiscal capacity cannot get
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more share because there is intra-State inequality. This has to be tackled
through other schemes including ones in State plans.
22 This is the view of State governments like Kerala.
23 The view is based on the proposition that distribution should be a national
priority and differential distributive policies at the provincial level will lead
to inter-provincial migration which will have consequent impact on tax
compliance.
24 Buoyancy is measured as the ratio of the rate of growth of Own tax revenue
and the Gross Domestic Product of the State, which is the tax base. This
captures both automatic response to income as well as discretionary changes.
But there needs to be some weighting of the tax base by its inverse so that
States with a poorer tax base and exploit it better will get a better weightage,
25 As regards other criteria like area, it can be eliminated if grants can take care
of problems of large States with backward districts on an accepted norm.
The incentive criteria like fiscal discipline and tax effort can be made basis
for devolution of additional grants on States achieving certain targets.
26 The grants devolved for filling gaps in the non-Plan revenue deficit can
act as a perverse incentive on own tax effort and also result in boosting
expenditure. When we tested the association between the impact of
devolution of taxes and grants and own tax effort of the States, using
Fixed Effects Model in panel Data Regression, it was seen that the
association is having negative sign and is statistically significant in the
case of grants and statistically insignificant in the case of taxes. We also
find that the association between own tax effort and total devolution is
negative and statistically significant.
27 Grants are decided in absolute amounts and grants recommended under
Article 275 are charged expenditure from Consolidated Fund of India. Tax
devolution is decided as a percentage and is subject to the increase and
decrease in tax revenue of the Centre. While recommending higher devolution
of taxes in place of Article 275 grants, this has to be kept in mind.
28 This includes the Shiromani Akali Dal in Punjab which passed the Anantapur
Sahib Resolution in 1973 calling for limiting the Centre’s power to Defence,
Foreign Affairs and Communications and the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam
(DMK) in Tamil Nadu which appointed the Rajamannar Committee on
Centre State relations in the early 1970s.
29 See Partha Chateerjee (1997) for a detailed discussion
30 Under this Article, President’s Rule could be imposed in a State by the
Centre based on the recommendation of the Governor or otherwise.
31 We are not discussing the separatist movements with fissiparous tendencies.
These movements like the ones in Punjab and Assam by and large subsided
during the 1990s.
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32 The suggestion to introduce Goods and Services Tax was proposed by the
Kelkar Task Force on indirect taxes. The recommendation was to have 20
percent rate on Goods and Services, out of which 12 percent will be the
share of the Centre and 8 percent will be the share of the State. Services are
in the Union List, but the Centre can notify certain Services to be taxed by
the States.  The redistribution of powers between the Centre and the State on
GST coming into being is not yet clear. The Thirteenth Finance Commission
can make an attempt to lay down a roadmap for GST after discussion with
the Centre and the States. Lack of clarity on the GST will make the
recommendations for devolution of taxes rather irrelevant in the context of
the post-GST situation.
33 In the Indian context, the Centripetal tendencies in the fiscal area are not
perceptible in ratios like increase in Centre’s share in total revenue collected
or increase in Centre’s share of expenditure as can be seen in the case of
European countries (See Mueller 2002, Lee (1994)  for a discussion). The
Centripetal tendencies however can be easily discerned from the trends in
tax reforms, conditionalities imposed in devolution and prevalence of
discretionary grants.
34 At the time of writing the earlier version of this paper, the voting of the Fifth
phase of the Lok Sabha Election 2009 had concluded and exit polls  predicted
a fractured mandate. This galvanised the moves for post poll alliances
mainly aimed at parties with strong regional bases. There were demands for
special State package as a quid pro quo for support and this was readily
agreed upon by parties.  It is a fact that it came from a low per capita income
state but such demands coming from a rich State also could find acceptance
depending on numbers required for a majority. The special packages make
devolution of resources highly discretionary and result in asymmetric
federalism. (Asymmetric federalism is India is the title of a paper written by
M. Govinda Rao and Nirvikar Singh recently). The poll results were more
decisive than expected and such demands did not come to the forefront.
With multiple parties in power in the States and the Centre still having
coalition government with parties having local aspirations foremost,, it
cannot be stated that centrifugal tendencies in the polity have been reversed,
though they prima facie, appear to be stymied for the present.
35 When Panel Data Regression was run using Fixed Effects Model, it was seen
that for both taxes and grants, the relationship between the share of a
respective State (being the dependent variable) and the per capita GSDP
(representing the fiscal capacity being the independent variable), was negative
and statistically significant at 1 percent level. But the value of the coefficient
in both the cases was very low. The R2 was 0.95 for tax devolution and 0.78
for grant devolution. The State-wise and State-group-wise analysis reveal a
clearer picture and hence this is used in the study.
36 The Finance Minister of Kerala Dr. T.M. Thomas Isaac in his maiden budget
speech of 2006 emphasised on revenue led fiscal consolidation. This has
been advocated in preference to a fiscal correction based on expenditure
cut by the Kelkar Task Force on implementation of the FRBM Act
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